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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-3813 
_____________ 
 
FRANKLYN RAFAEL GONZALEZ-RAMIREZ 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY OF THE  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; 
DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE); 
GARY MEAD, as Executive Associate Director for Enforcement and Removal 
Operations, ICE; JOHN TSOUKARIS, as Field Office Director for ICE at the Elizabeth 
Detention Center; FEDIRICO MADERA, as Assistant Field Office Director for ICE at 
the Elizabeth Detention Center; MARCOS CASTRO, as Detention Officer and Group 
Supervisor, ICE; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 
JUAN P. OSUNA, as Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review; BRIAN 
M. O’LEARY, as Chief Immigration Judge within the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ); 
MIRLANDE TADAL, as Immigration Judge within DOJ, located at the Elizabeth 
Detention Center; ORLANDO RODRIGUEZ, as Warden of the Elizabeth Detention 
Center, Corrections Corporation of America under contract with ICE 
 
ORLANDO RODRIGUEZ, 
            Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-12-cv-02978) 
District Judge: Hon. Jose L. Linares 
__________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 14, 2013 
 
Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: June 17, 2013) 
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__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________          
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Orlando Rodriguez, Warden of the Elizabeth Detention Center in New 
Jersey, appeals from the judgment of the U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Jersey granting a writ of habeas corpus to Franklyn Rafael Gonzalez-Ramirez, a citizen 
and native of the Dominican Republic and legal permanent resident of the United States.1
                                              
1 The District Court dismissed without prejudice the petition for writ of habeas corpus as 
to all named Respondents except Rodriguez, Warden of the Elizabeth Detention Center 
where Gonzalez-Ramirez was being held. Rodriguez is represented on appeal by counsel 
from the Department of Justice; for ease of reference we will refer to the Government as 
the party appealing from the District Court’s judgment. 
 
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall take 
into custody any” deportable alien who has committed a crime specified by statute “when 
the alien is released” from custody for that crime. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). Under the Act, 
these aliens must be held without possibility of release on bond during the pendency of 
their removal proceedings; this is referred to as “mandatory detention.” See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c)(2). The District Court held that for the Government to exercise “mandatory 
detention” authority under § 1226(c), it must detain aliens immediately upon their release 
from custody. Because the Government failed to immediately detain Gonzalez-Ramirez 
upon his release from state custody, but rather waited nearly four years, the District Court 
concluded that he could not be held in “mandatory detention” and that he was eligible for 
an individualized bond hearing.  
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Subsequent to the District Court’s decision here, this Court held in Sylvain v. 
Attorney General of the United States, 714 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2013) that the Government 
does not lose its § 1226(c) “mandatory detention” authority if it fails to detain an alien 
immediately upon release from state custody. Applying this teaching of our Court, which 
was not yet available to the District Court in these proceedings, we will reverse the 
District Court’s judgment.  
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and 
proceedings in this case, we will revisit them only briefly. 
Gonzalez-Ramirez is a citizen and native of the Dominican Republic and a legal 
permanent resident of the United States. On November 26, 2008, Gonzalez-Ramirez 
pleaded guilty in New York state court to attempted criminal sale of cocaine. He was 
never incarcerated subsequent to the conviction, but was sentenced to five years’ 
probation. In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear 
charging Gonzalez-Ramirez with removability as a result of his 2008 New York 
conviction, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers arrested 
him pursuant to an administrative warrant on March 14, 2012 and detained him at the 
Elizabeth Detention Center in New Jersey. After numerous custody hearings, an 
Immigration Judge determined that he was both removable and subject to “mandatory 
detention” based on his 2008 conviction.  
Gonzalez-Ramirez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 17, 2012, 
arguing that he could not be subject to “mandatory detention” because: (1) his 2008 
conviction resulted in probation rather than incarceration or detention, meaning that there 
was no “release” from custody for the Government to act upon pursuant to § 1226(c)(1), 
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and (2) even assuming that there was a “release” from custody, the Government failed to 
detain him immediately upon release as required by § 1226(c)(1). The District Court 
determined that it was unnecessary to decide whether there was a “release,” because the 
Government’s failure to immediately detain Gonzalez-Ramirez precluded its use of 
“mandatory detention” under § 1226(c)(1). Accordingly, the District Court granted 
Gonzalez-Ramirez’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and issued an order requiring an 
Immigration Judge to provide Gonzalez-Ramirez with an individualized bond hearing. 
Gonzalez-Ramirez was released on bond. The Government appeals.2
II. 
  
Applying the teachings of Sylvain, we conclude that Gonzalez-Ramirez was 
subject to “mandatory detention” under § 1226(c), notwithstanding the delay preceding 
his detention by the Government, and that therefore he was not eligible for a bond 
hearing. 
Section 1226(c) mandates detention of specified criminal aliens without any 
possibility of release on bond or conditional parole during removal proceedings. It 
provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody” any deportable alien who 
has committed certain crimes “when the alien is released, without regard to whether the 
alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to 
whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c)(1). 
A. 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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In Sylvain, an alien challenged the Government’s authority to subject him to 
“mandatory detention” without bond pursuant to § 1226(c), arguing that the 
Government’s failure to detain him immediately upon his release from prior custody 
eliminated its authority to impose “mandatory detention,” and the district court agreed. 
See 714 F.3d at 153. This Court reversed the judgment of the district court and held that 
the alien was subject to “mandatory detention” because “even if the statute calls for 
detention ‘when the alien is released,’ and even if ‘when’ implies some period of less 
than four years, nothing in the statute suggests that officials lose authority if they delay.” 
Id. at 161. Accordingly, the Government here did not lose its authority to subject 
Gonzalez-Ramirez to “mandatory detention” by virtue of the delay between his release 
and detention. 
B. 
The second issue—whether there was a “release” as required for detention under § 
1226(c)—need not unduly detain us. Before the District Court, Gonzalez-Ramirez 
contended that he could not be subject to “mandatory detention” under § 1226(c) because 
he was never incarcerated nor detained in state custody after his 2008 conviction, but 
rather he was sentenced to five years’ probation. He contends, therefore, that there was 
no “release” as required by § 1226(c). The Government responded by arguing that 
Gonzalez-Ramirez was at one point in pre-conviction custody following his 2007 arrest 
in New York, and that release from pre-conviction custody was sufficient to trigger 
“mandatory detention.” The District Court decided not to address this threshold issue 
because it concluded that the Government lost its “mandatory detention” authority when 
it failed to act immediately. 
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In Sylvain we addressed a similar argument. Sylvain received a “conditional 
discharge” after a conviction for a drug possession offense. Although he did not raise the 
argument before the district court, he argued before this Court that the “conditional 
discharge” did not qualify as a release. In rejecting this contention we said: 
[Sylvain] claims that the conditional discharge following his 2007 
conviction was not a “release []” within the meaning of the “when . . . 
released” clause. But Sylvain never raised this argument in the District 
Court. See Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 249 
(3d Cir. 2013) (“We generally refuse to consider issues that the parties have 
not raised below.”). In any event, his release from the 2007 arrest that led to 
his conviction and conditional discharge certainly fulfilled the release 
requirement, see In re Kotliar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 124, 125 (B.I.A. 2007); In re 
West
Sylvain, 714 F.3d at 161. The parties dispute the relevance of this portion of the Sylvain 
opinion. The Government contends that Sylvain “held that release from a pre-conviction 
arrest fulfilled the release requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).” Government’s Apr. 24, 
2013 Rule 28(j) Letter at 2. Gonzalez-Ramirez contends that this language should be 
treated as non-binding dicta, because the “Court actually held that Sylvain had failed to 
raise the issue of pre-conviction release before the District Court, and it therefore refused 
to consider the issue.” Gonzalez-Ramirez’s May 14, 2013 Rule 28(j) Letter at 1. We 
disagree with Gonzalez-Ramirez’s contention that the Sylvain Court refused to consider 
whether a pre-conviction arrest and release satisfied the release requirement. Although 
the Court noted that Sylvain’s argument was first raised on appeal, it considered the 
argument and rejected it, citing two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals in 
support of its conclusion. Accordingly, we conclude that because Gonzalez-Ramirez was 
released from pre-conviction custody following his arrest, he was subject to “mandatory 
detention.” 
, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1405, 1410 (B.I.A. 2000)—to say nothing of whether 
the conditional discharge did the same.  
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III. 
In Sylvain, we noted that reversing the district court’s judgment “effectively 
denies Sylvain’s original habeas petition and thus makes him ineligible for a bond 
hearing under § 1226(a). Although Sylvain has already received such a hearing and was 
released on bond, our holding sets aside that proceeding.” 714 F.3d at 161 n.12. We 
follow that approach here, and our reversal of the District Court’s judgment both denies 
Gonzalez-Ramirez’s habeas petition and sets aside his bond proceeding.   
* * * * *  
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude 
that no further discussion is necessary.  The judgment of the District Court will be 
REVERSED. 
